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Abstract
In [7] the authors of this paper argued in favor of the possibility to con-
sider a Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions (PAQS).
We claimed that, even though most interpretations of quantum me-
chanics (QM) attempt to escape contradictions, there are many hints
—coming from present technical and experimental developments in
QM— that indicate it could be worth while to engage in a research
of this kind. Recently, Arenhart and Krause have raised several ar-
guments against the PAQS [1, 2, 3]. In [11, 12] it was argued that
their reasoning presupposes a metaphysical stance according to which
the physical representation of reality must be exclusively considered in
terms of the equation: Actuality = Reality. However, from a different
metaphysical standpoint their problems disappear. It was also argued
that, if we accept the idea that quantum superpositions exist in a (con-
tradictory) potential realm, it makes perfect sense to develop QM in
terms of a paraconsistent approach and claim that quantum superpo-
sitions are contradictory, contextual existents. Following these ideas,
and taking as a standpoint an interpretation in terms of the physical
notions of power and potentia put forward in [10, 12, 15], we present a
paraconsistent formalization of quantum superpositions that attempts
to capture the main features of QM.
Keywords: quantum superpositions, paraconsistent logics, powers, potentiality.
1
Introduction
In [7], the authors of this paper argued in favor of the possibility to consider
quantum superpositions in terms of paraconsistent logics. We claimed that,
even though most interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM) attempt to
escape contradictions, there are many hints —coming mainly from present
technical and experimental developments in QM— that indicate it could be
worth while to engage in a research of this kind. Recently, Arenhart and
Krause [1, 2, 3] have raised several arguments against this approach. More
specifically, taking into account the square of opposition, they have argued
that quantum superpositions are better understood in terms of contrariety
propositions rather than contradictory propositions. In [11, 12] we defended
the Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions (PAQS) and pro-
vided arguments in favor of its development. We showed that: i) Arenhart
and Krause placed their obstacles from a specific metaphysical stance, which
we characterized in terms of what we call the Orthodox Line of Research
(OLR). And also, ii) That this is not necessarily the only possible line, and
that a different one, namely, a Constructive Metaphysical Line of Research
(CMLR) provides a different perspective in which PAQS can be regarded as
a valuable prospect. Furthermore, we explained how, within the CMLR, the
problems and obstacles raised by Arenhart and Krause disappear.
We characterized the OLR in terms of two main principles:
1. Quantum to Classical Limit: The principle that one must find a
“bridge” or “limit” between classical mechanics and QM.
2. Classical Representation of Physics: The principle that one needs
to presuppose the classical representation of physics (which assumes
the metaphysical equation: Actuality = Reality) in order to interpret
QM.
More specifically, regarding quantum superpositions, we have showed how
the Measurement Problem (MP), one of the main questions imposed by the
OLR, has closed the door to a true development of the theory. Given the
fact that QM describes mathematically the state of a quantum system in
terms of a superposition, the question is why do we observe a single result
instead of a superposition of them?1 The MP accepts the fact that there
1Given a quantum system represented by a superposition
∑
ci|αi〉, when in contact
with an apparatus ready to measure, |R0〉, QM predicts that system and apparatus will
become “entangled” in such a way that the final ‘system + apparatus’ will be described
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is something very weird about quantum superpositions but, leaving aside
their problematic meaning, focuses on the justification of the actualization
process.
Taking distance from the OLR, the CMLR is based on three main pre-
suppositions already put forward and discussed in [9, pp. 56-57].
1. Closed Representational Stance: Each physical theory is closed
under its own formal and conceptual structure and provides access to
a specific field of phenomena. The theory provides the constraints to
consider, explain and understand physical phenomena. It is only the
theory which can tell you what can be observed.
2. Formalism and Empirical Adequacy: The formalism of QM is
able to provide (outstanding) empirically adequate results. Empirical
adequacy determines the success of a theory and not its commitment
to a certain presupposed conception of the world. Thus, it seems to
us that the problem is not to find a new formalism. On the contrary,
the ‘road signs’ point in the direction that we must stay close to the
orthodox quantum formalism.
3. Constructive Conceptual Stance: Since classical physical concepts
do not seem well suited to provide a coherent understanding of QM
and its phenomena, to learn about what the formalism of QM is telling
us about reality we might be in need of creating new physical concepts.
Changing the metaphysical standpoint, the CMLR also presents a different
questioning which assumes right from the start the need of bringing into
stage a different metaphysical scheme to the one assumed by the OLR —
based on the notion of a system constituted by properties in the actual mode
of existence. What is needed, according to this stance, is a radical inversion
of orthodoxy and its problems. The CMLR attempts to bring back meta-
physical considerations within the analysis of QM taking into account three
main ideas: the first is that physical observation is theory-laden and thus
always metaphysically founded; the second is that operational counterfac-
tual reasoning about Meaningful Physical Statements (MPS)2 is the kernel
by
∑
ci|αi〉|Ri〉. Thus, as a consequence of the quantum evolution, the pointers have also
become —like the original quantum system— a superposition of pointers
∑
ci|Ri〉. This
is why the MP can be stated as a problem only in the case the original quantum state is
described by a superposition of more than one term.
2In [14] we defined Meaningful Physical Statements (MPS): If given a specific
situation a theory is capable of predicting in terms of definite physical statements the
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of physical discourse and in consequence cannot be abandoned if we seek
to find an objective representation of physical reality; the third and final
consideration is that predictions must be necessarily related to the physical
representation of reality provided by the theory.
Representational Realist Stance (RRS): A representational realist ac-
count of a physical theory must be capable of providing a physical repre-
sentation of reality in terms of a network of concepts which relates to the
mathematical formalism of the theory and allows to make predictions of def-
inite phenomena.
From this standpoint a coherent interpretation of QM should be able to
explain in what sense quantum superpositions, which give rise to different
sets of MPS, are part of the physical representation of reality provided by the
theory. Instead of considering the MP, which attempts to justify the actual
observational realm, we should focus in providing a physical representation
of quantum superpositions (see for discussion [12]) —a representation that
goes beyond the discourse of measurement outcomes.
Following this line of research, if we accept the idea that quantum su-
perpositions might exist in a contradictory potential realm —leaving aside
the idea that: Actuality = Reality—, it makes perfect sense to approach
QM in terms of a paraconsistent approach and claim that quantum super-
positions are contradictory existents. Following these ideas, and taking as
a standpoint a suitable interpretation in terms of the notions of power and
potentia we present in this paper a paraconsistent formalization of quantum
superpositions. The article is organized as follows. In section 1, we discuss
the problem of representing quantum superpositions in terms of physical no-
tions. Section 2 analyzes the meaning of modality in QM and puts forward
an interpretation in terms of ‘ontological potentiality’. Section 3, presents
the notion of ‘power’ as a real physical existent. In section 4, we analyze the
meaning of contradiction in the actual and the potential realms. In section
5 we provide a particular formalization of quantum superpositions in terms
of contradictory powers in the potential realm. Finally, section 6 presents
the conclusions of the paper.
outcomes of possible measurements, then such physical statements are meaningful relative
to the theory and must be constitutive parts of the particular representation of physical
reality that the theory provides. Measurement outcomes must be considered only as an
exposure of the empirical adequacy (or not) of the theory.
4
1 The Physical Representation of Quantum Su-
perpositions
The CMLR focuses in the Superposition Problem (SP) which attempts to
put forward a physical representation of quantum superpositions leaving
aside the famous MP which —following the OLR— attempts instead to jus-
tify the actual (non-contradictory) realm of existence and concentrates in
the analysis of the measurement process.3 The shift in the focus of the prob-
lem means at the same time going against a basic tenet taken by many of the
founding fathers regarding the presupposed limits of physical representation
in quantum theory. Indeed, the idea that quantum superpositions cannot
be physically represented was stated already in 1930 by Paul Dirac in the
first edition of his famous book, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics.
“The nature of the relationships which the superposition principle re-
quires to exist between the states of any system is of a kind that cannot
be explained in terms of familiar physical concepts. One cannot in the
classical sense picture a system being partly in each of two states and
see the equivalence of this to the system being completely in some other
state. There is an entirely new idea involved, to which one must get
accustomed and in terms of which one must proceed to build up an ex-
act mathematical theory, without having any detailed classical picture.”
[20, p. 12] (emphasis added)
Also Niels Bohr was eager to defend the classical physical representation
of our world and set the limits of such representation in classical physics
itself [5]. Bohr [34, p. 7] argued that: “[...] the unambiguous interpreta-
tion of any measurement must be essentially framed in terms of classical
physical theories, and we may say that in this sense the language of Newton
and Maxwell will remain the language of physicists for all time.” At the
same time he closed any further conceptual development by arguing that “it
would be a misconception to believe that the difficulties of the atomic theory
may be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical physics by
new conceptual forms.” Even Schro¨dinger, who was one of the first to see
the implications of the superposition principle, exposing it through his
also famous “cat experiment”, didn’t dare to explore beyond the accepted
3Superposition Problem (SP): Given a specific situation in which there is a quan-
tum superposition of more than one term,
∑
ci |αi〉, and given the fact that each one of
the terms relates trough the Born rule to a MPS, the problem is how do we physically
represent this mathematical expression, and in particular, the multiple terms?
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limits of classical physical reality remaining inside the gates of our classical
metaphysical understanding of the world [32].
Unfortunately, these ideas have sedimented in the present foundational
research regarding QM. Indeed, the strategy of the OLR has been to focus on
two main problems which deal with the justification of classical physics. The
first is the basis problem which attempts to explain how nature “chooses”
a single basis —between the many possible ones— when an experimental
arrangement is determined in the laboratory —this also relates to the prob-
lem of contextuality which we have analyzed in detail in [9]. The second
problem is the already mentioned MP. Given the fact that QM describes
mathematically the state in terms of a superposition, the question is why
do we observe a single result instead of a superposition of them? The MP
focuses on the justification of the actualization process. Taking as a stand-
point the single outcome it asks: how do we get to a single measurement
result from the quantum superposition?4 The MP places the outcome in the
origin, and what needs to be justified is the already known answer. Contrary
to the OLR, our main interest focuses on the SP which stresses the need of
providing a physical representation of quantum superpositions (expressed in
general by the mathematical expression:
∑
ci |αi〉). But in order to engage
in such a project we first need to go beyond the questioning regarding mea-
surement outcomes. Before we can understand actualization we first need to
explain what a quantum superposition is or represents. There are multiple
ways of interpreting the projection postulate [16] and thus there is no self
evident path between the superposition and its outcome. Even the OLR
will have to recognize that we are in need of providing a proper coherent
physical interpretation of quantum superpositions.
Our research is focused on the hypothesis that quantum superpositions
relate to something physically real that exists in Nature, and that in or-
der to understand QM we need to provide a physical representation of such
existents. But why do we think we have good reasons to believe that quan-
tum superpositions exist? As clearly expressed by Griffiths [27, p. 361]:
“If a theory makes a certain amount of sense and gives predictions which
agree reasonably well with experimental or observational results, scientists
are inclined to believe that its logical and mathematical structure reflects
the structure of the real world in some way, even if philosophers will remain
permanently skeptical.” Quantum superpositions are one of the main sources
4The questioning is completely analogous to the one posed by the quantum to classi-
cal limit problem: how do we get from contextual weird QM into our classical physical
description of the world?
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used by present experimental physicists in order to put forward the most
outstanding technical and experimental developments of the last decades.
Indeed, there are many characteristics and behaviors we have learnt about
superpositions: we know about their existence regardless of the effectuation
of one of its terms, as shown, for example, by the interference of different
possibilities in welcher-weg type experiments [6, 29], their reference to con-
tradictory properties, as in Schro¨dinger cat states [30], we also know about
their non-standard route to actuality, as explicitly shown by the modal KS
theorem [21, 16], and we even know about their non-classical interference
with themselves and with other superpositions, used today within the latest
technical developments in quantum information processing [4]. In spite of
the fact we still cannot say what a quantum superposition is or represents,
we must admit that they seem ontologically robust. If the terms within a
quantum superposition are considered as quantum possibilities (of being ac-
tualized) then we must also admit that such quantum possibilities interact
—according to the Schro¨dingier equation. It is also well known that one can
produce interactions between multiple superpositions (entanglement) and
then predict their evolution as well as the ratio of all possible outcomes. It
then becomes difficult not to believe that these terms that ‘interact’, ‘evolve’
and ‘can be predicted’ according to the theory, are not real (in some way).
Leaving aside these known facts, the orthodox perspective assumed by a
numerous group of interpretations seems to disregard the idea that quantum
superpositions are real physical existents. Maybe the most known interpre-
tation between them is the so called “Copenhagen interpretation” which
remains agnostic with respect to the mode of existence of properties prior
to measurement. The same interpretation is endorsed by van Fraassen in
his Copenhagen modal variant.5 Much more extreme is the instrumental-
ist perspective put forward by Fuchs and Peres [26, p. 1] who claim that:
“[...] quantum theory does not describe physical reality. What it does is
provide an algorithm for computing probabilities for the macroscopic events
(“detector clicks”) that are the consequences of experimental interventions.”
But even within realistic interpretations there is a complete lack of physical
5According to Van Fraassen [33, p. 280]: “The interpretational question facing us is
exactly: in general, which value attributions are true? The response to this question can be
very conservative or very liberal. Both court later puzzles. I take it that the Copenhagen
interpretation —really, a roughly correlated set of attitudes expressed by members of the
Copenhagen school, and not a precise interpretation— introduced great conservatism in
this respect. Copenhagen scientists appeared to doubt or deny that observables even have
values, unless their state forces to say so. I shall accordingly refer to the following very
cautious answer as the Copenhagen variant of the modal interpretation. It is the variant
I prefer.”
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explanation regarding the meaning of quantum superpositions (see for a de-
tailed analysis [14]). In Dieks’ realistic modal version as well as in Griffiths
consistent histories interpretation quantum superpositions are not consid-
ered as real physical existents. Given a Ψ, only one of its mathematical
representations is related to reality (actuality) —namely, the representation
in which Ψ is written as a single term— while all other representations are
considered merely as “computational tools” to calculate outcomes. Bohmian
versions neglect “right from the start” the existence of quantum superpo-
sitions and propose instead —changing the formalism— the existence of a
quantum field that governs the evolution of particles. One might also argue
that some interpretations, although not explicitly, leave space to consider
superpositions as existent in a potential, propensity or dispositional realm.
The Jauch and Piron School, Popper or Margenau’s interpretations, are a
clear example of such proposal (see for discussion [9] and references therein).
However, within such interpretations the collapse is accepted and potentiali-
ties, propensities or dispositions are only defined in terms of ‘their becoming
actual’ —mainly because, forced by the OLR, they have been only focused in
providing an answer to the MP. In any case, such realms are not articulated
beyond their meaning in terms of the actual realm. Only the many worlds
interpretation goes as far as claiming that all terms in the superposition are
real in actuality. However, the quite expensive metaphysical price to pay
is to argue that there is a multiplicity of unobservable worlds (branches) in
which each one of the terms is actual. Thus, the superposition expresses the
multiplicity of such classical actual worlds.
Instead of taking one of these two paths which force us either into the
abandonment of representation and physical reality or to the exclusive ac-
count of physical representation in terms of an Actual State of Affairs we
have proposed, through the CMLR, to develop a new path which is focused
in developing radically new (non-classical) physical concepts.
2 Modality in Quantum Mechanics
QM has been related to modality since its origin, when Max Born interpreted
Schro¨dingier’s quantum wave function, Ψ, as a “probability wave”. However,
it was very clear from the very beginning that the meaning of modality
and probability in the context of QM was something completely new. As
remarked by Heisenberg himself:
“[The] concept of the probability wave [in QM] was something entirely
new in theoretical physics since Newton. Probability in mathemat-
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ics or in statistical mechanics means a statement about our degree of
knowledge of the actual situation. In throwing dice we do not know
the fine details of the motion of our hands which determine the fall of
the dice and therefore we say that the probability for throwing a spe-
cial number is just one in six. The probability wave function, however,
meant more than that; it meant a tendency for something.” [28, p. 42]
Today, it is well known that quantum probability does not allow an inter-
pretation in terms of ignorance —even though many papers in the litera-
ture still use probability uncritically in this way. Instead, as we mentioned
above, the quantum formalism seems to imply some kind of weird interac-
tion of possibilities governed by the Schro¨dingier equation (see for discussion
[14, 15, 19]).
As discussed above, the problems put forward by the OLR do not fo-
cus on the development of a new non-classical physical representation of
QM and have concentrated their efforts instead, in justifying our classical
representation of entities constituted by properties in the actual mode of
existence. We are convinced that only when leaving behind the OLR and
its problems, one might be able to discuss about a non-classical development
of the theory. Of course this implies reconsidering the meaning of existence
itself and the abandonment of another presupposed dogma, namely, that
existence and reality are represented by actuality either as an observation
hic et nunc (empiricism) or as a mode of existence (realism). Following the
CMLR, we believe a reasonable strategy would then be to start with what
we know works perfectly well, namely, the orthodox formalism of QM and
advance in the metaphysical principles which constitute our understanding
of the theory. Escaping the metaphysics of actuality and starting from the
formalism, a good candidate to develop a mode of existence that is implicit
within the theory itself is of course quantum possibility.
In several papers, one of us together with G. Domenech and H. Freytes,
have analyzed how to understand possibility in the context of the ortho-
dox formalism of QM [21, 22, 23, 24]. From this investigation there are
several conclusions which can be drawn. We started our analysis with a
question regarding the contextual aspect of possibility. As it is well known,
the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem does not talk about probabilities, but
rather about the constraints of the formalism to actual definite valued prop-
erties considered from multiple contexts. What we found via the analysis of
possible families of valuations is that a theorem which we called —for obvi-
ous reasons— the Modal KS (MKS) theorem can be derived which proves
that quantum possibility, contrary to classical possibility, is also contextu-
9
ally constrained [21]. This means that, regardless of its use in the literature:
quantum possibility is not classical possibility. In a recent paper, [16] we have
concentrated in the analysis of actualization within the orthodox frame and
interpreted, following the structure, the logical realm of possibility in terms
of potentiality.
As we remarked in [12], once we accept we have two distinct realms of
existence, namely, an actual realm and a potential realm, we must be careful
about the way in which we define contradictions. Certainly, contradictions
cannot be defined in terms of truth valuations in the actual realm, simply
because, contradictions cannot be found in actuality —which is a realm ex-
plicitly defined in terms of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (see [15]).
The physical notion that must be related to quantum superpositions must
be, according to our research, an existent in the potential realm —not in
the actual one. The MKS theorem shows explicitly that a quantum wave
function implies multiple incompatible valuations which can be interpreted
as potential contradictions [16]. Our analysis has always kept in mind the
idea that classical contradictions, that is, contradictions according to clas-
sical logic, are never found in the actual realm. Our attempt is to turn
things upside-down: we do not need to explain the actual via the potential
but rather, we need to use the actual in order to develop the potential [9, p.
148].
Leaving aside the widespread paranoia against contradictions, the PAQS
does the job of allowing a further formal development of a realm in which
all terms of a superposition co-exist, regardless of actuality. In the sense
just discussed the PAQS opens possibilities of development which have not
yet been fully investigated. It should be also clear that we are not claim-
ing that all terms in the superposition are actual —as in the many worlds
interpretations— overpopulating existence with unobservable actual worlds.
What we claim is that PAQS opens the door to consider all terms as exis-
tent in a realm different of actuality. We claim that just like we need all
properties to characterize a physical object, all terms in the superposition
are needed for a proper characterization of what exists according to QM. We
should stress that each term in a quantum superposition relates directly to
a MPS of the theory which can be empirically tested. Contrary to Arenhart
and Krause we do not agree that our proposal is subject of Priest’ razor:
the metaphysical principle according to which we should not populate the
world with contradictions beyond necessity [31]. The PAQS does not over-
populate metaphysically the world with contradictions, but rather attempts
to take into account all MPS provided by QM. We should not forget that
experimentalists are using explicitly such MPS in order to produce in the
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lab a new technical era.6
The modal interpretation proposed in [9] attempts to develop —following
the CMLR— a physical representation of the formalism based on three main
notions: the notions of ontological potentiality, power and potentia.7 The
notion of ontological potentiality has been explicitly developed taking into
account what we have learnt from the orthodox formalism about quantum
possibility, taking potentiality to its limit and escaping the dogmatic ruling
of actuality. Contrary to the teleological notion of potentiality used within
many interpretations of QM our notion of ontological potentiality is not de-
fined in terms of actuality. Such perspective has determined not only the
need to consider what we call a Potential State of Affairs —in analogous
fashion to the Actual State of Affairs considered within classical physical
theories—, but also the distinction between actual effectuations, the effec-
tuation of potentiality in the actual realm, and potential effectuations which
is that which happens in the potential realm regardless of actuality (see for
discussion [16]). Actualization only discusses the actual effectuation of the
potential, while potential effectuations remain in the potential realm evolv-
ing according to QM. The question we would like to discuss in the following
section is: what is that which exists in the potential realm?
3 Powers as Quantum Physical Existents
Entities are composed by properties which exist in the actual mode of being.
But what is that which exists in the ontological potential realm? We have
argued that an interesting candidate to consider is the notion of power.
Elsewhere [9, 10, 12, 15], one of us has put forward such an ontological
interpretation of powers. In the following we summarize such ideas and
provide an axiomatic characterization of QM in line with these concepts.
The mode of being of a power is potentiality, not thought in terms of
classical possibility (which relies on actuality) but rather as a mode of exis-
tence —i.e., in terms of ontological potentiality. Powers are indetermined.
To possess the power of raising my hand, does not mean that in the future
‘I will raise my hand’ or that in the future ‘I will not raise my hand’; what it
6Regarding observation it is important to remark that such contradictory potentialities
are observable just in the same way as actual properties can be observed in an object.
Potentialities can be observed through actual effectuations in analogous fashion to physical
objects —we never observe all perspectives of an object simultaneously, instead, we observe
at most a single set of actual properties.
7Different modal approaches might be also considered [8] taking into account their
specificity with respect to paraconsistency and modality.
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means is that, here and now, I possess a power which exists in the mode of
being of potentiality, independently of what will happen in actuality. Powers
do not exist in the mode of being of actuality, they are not actual existents,
they are undetermined potential existents. Powers, like classical proper-
ties, preexist to observation, but unlike them preexistence is not defined in
the actual mode of being as an Actual State of Affairs (ASA), instead we
have a potential preexistence of powers which determines a Potential State
of Affairs (PSA). Powers are a conceptual machinery which can allow us to
compress experience into a picture of the world, just like entities such as
particles, waves and fields, allow us to do so in classical physics. We cannot
“see” powers in the same way we see objects.8 Powers are experienced in
actuality through elementary processess. A power is sustained by a logic of
actions which do not necessarily take place, it is and is not, hic et nunc.
A basic question which we have posed to ourselves regards the ontologi-
cal meaning of a quantum superposition [10]. What does it mean to have a
mathematical expression such as: α| ↑〉 + β| ↓〉, which allows us to predict
precisely, according to the Born rule, experimental outcomes? Our theory of
powers has been explicitly developed in order to try to answer this particular
question. Given a superposition in a particular basis, Σ ci|αi〉, the powers
are represented by the elements of the basis, |αi〉, while the coordinates
in square modulus, |ci|2, are interpreted as the potentia of each respective
power.9 Powers can be superposed to different —even contradictory— pow-
ers. We understand a quantum superposition as encoding a set of powers
each of which possesses a definite potentia. This we call a Quantum Situation
(QS). For example, the quantum situation represented by the superposi-
tion α| ↑〉 + β| ↓〉, combines the contradictory powers, | ↑〉 and | ↓〉, with
their potentia, |α|2 and |β|2, respectively. Contrary to the orthodox inter-
pretation of the quantum state, we do not assume the metaphysical identity
of the multiple mathematical representations given by different bases [18].
Each superposition is basis dependent and must be considered as a distinct
quantum situation. For example, the superposition cx1| ↑x〉 + cx2| ↓x〉 and
the superposition cy1| ↑y〉+cy2| ↓y〉, which are representations of the same Ψ
and can be derived from one another via a change in basis, are interpreted
as two different quantum situations, QSΨ,Bx and QSΨ,By .
The logical structure of a superposition is such that a power and its
8It is important to notice there is no difference in this point with the case of entities:
we cannot “see” entities —not in the sense of having a complete access to them. We only
see perspectives which are unified through the notion of object.
9Our approach considers finite bases, the extension to infinite bases is not difficult and
will be considered in future works.
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opposite can exist at one and the same time, violating the principle of non-
contradiction [7]. Within the faculty of raising my hand, both powers (i.e.,
the power ‘I am able to raise my hand’ and the power ‘I am able not to raise
my hand’) co-exist. A QS is compressed activity, something which is and is
not the case, hic et nunc. It cannot be thought in terms of identity but is
expressed as a difference, as a quantum.
The power interpretation of QM can be condensed in the following eight
postulates.
I. Hilbert Space: QM is represented in a vector Hilbert space.
II. Potential State of Affairs (PSA): A specific vector Ψ with no
given mathematical representation (basis) in Hilbert space represents
a PSA; i.e., the definite existence of a multiplicity of powers, each one
of them with a specific potentia.
III. Actual State of Affairs (ASA): Given a PSA and the choice of a
definite basis B,B′, B′′, ..., etc. —or equivalently a Complete Set of
Commuting Observables (C.S.C.O.)—, a context is defined in which a
set of powers, each one of them with a definite potentia, are univocally
determined as related to a specific experimental arrangement (which
in turn corresponds to a definite ASA). The context builds a bridge
between the potential and the actual realms, between quantum powers
and classical objects. The experimental arrangement (in the ASA)
allows the powers (in the PSA) to express themselves in actuality
through elementary processes which produce actual effectuations.
IV. Quantum Situations, Powers and Potentia: Given a PSA, Ψ,
and the context we call a quantum situation to any superposition of
one or more than one power. In general given the basis B = {|αi〉} the
quantum situation QSΨ,B is represented by the following superposition
of powers:
c1|α1〉+ c2|α2〉+ ...+ cn|αn〉 (1)
We write the quantum situation of the PSA, Ψ, in the context B in
terms of the ordered pair, (|αi〉, |ci|2) with n less than or equal to
n, given by the elements of the basis and the coordinates in square
modulus of the PSA in that basis:
QSΨ,B = (|αi〉, |ci|2) (2)
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The elements of the basis, |αi〉, are interpreted in terms of powers.
The coordinates of the elements of the bases in square modulus, |ci|2,
are interpreted as the potentia of the power |αi〉, respectively. Given
the PSA and the context, the quantum situation, QSΨ,B, is univocally
determined in terms of a set of powers and their respective potentia.
(Notice that in contradistinction with the notion of ‘quantum state’
the definition of a ‘quantum situation’ is basis dependent.)
V. Elementary Process: In QM we only observe discrete shifts of en-
ergy (quantum postulate). These discrete shifts are interpreted in
terms of elementary processes which produce actual effectuations. An
elementary process is the path which undertakes a power from the po-
tential realm to its actual effectuation. This path is governed by the
immanent cause which allows the power to remain preexistent in the
potential realm independently of its actual effectuation. Each power
|αi〉 is univocally related to an elementary process represented by the
projection operator Pαi = |αi〉〈αi|.
VI. Actual Effectuation of Powers (Measurement): Powers exist in
the mode of being of ontological potentiality. An actual effectuation
is the expression of a specific power in actuality. Different actual
effectuations expose the different powers of a given QS. In order to
learn about a specific PSA (constituted by a set of powers and their
potentia) we must measure repeatedly the actual effectuations of each
power exposed in the laboratory. (Notice that we consider a laboratory
as constituted by the set of all possible experimental arrangements that
can be related to the same Ψ.)
VII. Potentia (Born Rule): A potentia is the strength of a power to exist
in the potential realm and to express itself in the actual realm. Given
a PSA, the potentia is represented via the Born rule. The potentia pi
of the power |αi〉 in the specific PSA, Ψ, is given by:
Potentia (|αi〉,Ψ) = 〈Ψ|Pαi |Ψ〉 = Tr[PΨPαi ] (3)
In order to learn about a QS we must observe not only its powers
(which are exposed in actuality through actual effectuations) but we
must also measure the potentia of each respective power. In order to
measure the potentia of each power we need to expose the QS statis-
tically through a repeated series of observations. The potentia, given
by the Born rule, coincides with the probability frequency of repeated
measurements when the number of observations goes to infinity.
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VIII. Potential Effectuation of Powers (Schro¨dinger Evolution): Given
a PSA, Ψ, powers and potentia evolve deterministically, independently
of actual effectuations, producing potential effectuations according to
the following unitary transformation:
i~
d
dt
|Ψ(t)〉 = H|Ψ(t)〉 (4)
While potential effectuations evolve according to the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion, actual effectuations are particular expressions of each power (that
constitutes the PSA, Ψ) in the actual realm. The ratio of such expres-
sions in actuality is determined by the potentia of each power.
According to our interpretation, just like classical physics talks about en-
tities composed by properties that preexist in the actual realm, QM talks
about powers with definite potentia that preexist in the (ontological) po-
tential realm, independently of the specific actual context of inquiry or the
particular set of actualizations. This interpretational move allows us to de-
fine powers independently of the context regaining an objective picture of
physical reality independent of measurements and subjective choices. The
price we are willing to pay is the abandonment of a metaphysical equation
that has been presupposed in the analysis of QM: Actuality = Reality. In
the following section, talking into account a typical quantum experience, we
discuss in what sense powers are to be considered in terms of contradictory
statements in the potential realm.
4 Potential Contradictions and the Actual Realm
In order to criticize the notion of contradiction supposedly assumed by the
PAQS, Arenhart and Krause [2] presented several conditions which accord-
ing to their analysis, they claim, become incompatible within our approach.
Firstly they propose the following semantic requirement:
Definition 4.1 Semantic Requirement (SR): Contradictory statements
[of the language] must have opposite truth values.
To analyze a specific situation in QM they take the following quantum state:
α | ↑x〉+ β | ↓x〉 and claim that: “The statements corresponding to properties
represented by | ↑x〉〈↑x | and | ↓x〉〈↓x | must have opposite truth values.”
[Op. cit., p. 2] They then proceed to consider two property ascriptions, the
minimal property ascription condition.
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Definition 4.2 Minimal Property Ascription (MPA): If a system is
in an eigenstate of an operator with eigenvalue v, then the system has the
qualitative property corresponding to such value of the observable.
And the paraconsistent property ascription:
Definition 4.3 Paraconsistent Property Ascription (PPA): When in
a superposition [of the type α | ↑x〉 + β | ↓x〉], the system does have the
properties related to the vectors forming the superposition, and they are con-
tradictory.
Arenhart and Krause then argue that: “when the conditions for appli-
cation of the minimal principle [MPA] are met, both states have opposite
truth values. But the job is still not done: we must still grant that one
of those propositions must always be the case (being so that the other one
will be false), as the semantic requirement [SR] for a contradiction seems to
demand.” [Op. cit., p. 5] Their conclusion is then the following:
“[...] it seems that the semantic requirement [SR] that one of the two
terms in a superposition must always be the case (so that we can have
a contradiction) is in fact in conflict with the paraconsistent property
attribution [PPA] principle. For the latter principle to apply, in the
case of a superposition, both ‘up’ and ‘down’ would have to be the
case simultaneously. Recall what happens in the case of the two slit
or Schro¨dinger’s cat: according to this proposal [PAQS], the particle
must go by both slits, the cat must be dead and alive. So, there cannot
be alternate truth values in this case, for both must be simply true.
So, there is a conflict of the paraconsistent property attribution [PPA]
principle with the very requirement that the vectors in a superposition
stand for contradictory properties, at least according to the usual se-
mantic requirements [SR] related to contradictions, as it appears in the
traditional analysis of this concept. It seems that one cannot have both
the claim that ux [| ↑x〉〈↑x |] and dx [| ↓x〉〈↓x |] are contradictory and
the claim that a superposition involves contradictions, as supplied by
the paraconsistent property attribution [PPA] principle. As it stands,
it seems, these demands are incompatible.” [Op. cit., p. 5]
Let us analyze the presuppositions for the argument to stand. Both
conditions, SR and MPA, imply an analysis either in terms of actuality
or actualization. But as we mentioned above, the notion of contradiction
that we mean to put forward must consider a realm of potentiality truly
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independent of actuality. If the superposition (as a physical notion) exists in
potentiality, such conditions cannot be taken into account for they implicitly
assume that what is found out in actuality must be directly referred to
superpositions irrespectively of their mode of existence. However, if the
mode of existence to which such conditions make reference are considered,
there is plenty of room to take them into account within the PAQS.
An analogy with the measurement of a power can show us why the ar-
gument of Krause and Arenhart does not follow irrespectively of the meta-
physical considerations of the subject under study. Let us, for the sake
of the argument, admit that powers —which, as discussed above, are not
entities— exist in a potential realm. There exist contradictory powers such
as ‘putting my hand up’ or ‘putting my hand down’ (following the PPA).
If I ‘put my hand up’ (in actuality) then everyone who is looking will learn
that I posses such a specific power (as demanded by the MPA), and at the
same time, everyone will have observed that (in actuality) I did not ‘put
my hand down’ (only one of the two possibilities will be ‘true’ in the actual
realm as required by the SR) —vice versa, when I ‘put my hand down’. The
expression of a power in actuality exposes its existence in exactly the same
way we can only observe an object when light shines upon it.
In order to make even more clear our proposal let us consider some ques-
tions. First question: does the measurement of a power involve a collapse?
The answer is no: the expression of a power in terms of its actual effectua-
tion does not imply that the power has been destroyed nor that it has ceased
to exist. The fact that I ‘put my hand up’ in actuality does not imply in
any way that I will cease to have this power in the future or that the power
has suffered some kind of deterioration. The power remains in the potential
realm capable of producing new actual (and potential) effectuations. Second
question: do we need actuality to claim that a power exists? The answer is
no: I could choose not to raise my hand but nonetheless still claim that the
power exists —in the same way that when I close my eyes I can still claim
that the table in front of me exists. According to our RRS, physical reality
is completely independent of particular human observations. This simple
example attempts to show that if one moves away from the metaphysics of
‘entities’ and ‘properties’, there are different ways to think about physical
reality. Entities and properties in the actual mode of being might not be
the end of the road.
What is at stake in QM is the meaning itself of existence —QM does not
seem to make reference to an ASA—, this is why we have insisted that we are
not committed necessarily to the equation implied by the OLR, ‘Actuality =
Reality’. SR and MPA are not necessary conditions for every interpretation
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of QM that we can think of. They already imply a metaphysical stance in
which reality is conceived only in terms of entities constituted by properties
in the actual mode of existence. But, as we have shown above, if we include
the mode of existence of potentiality within the conditions themselves, we
can certainly provide a consistent account of SR, MPA and PPA within
the PAQS. By claiming that PPA refers to the potential realm while MPA
refers to actualization —something we have discussed in detain in [11, 12]—
and SR to the actual realm, all conditions are met by the PAQS and the
problems raised by Arenhart and Krause disappear.
The misinterpretation put forward by Arenhart and Krause with respect
to the PAQS is clarified once we recognize that the classical notion of truth is
directly related to the actual realm and that the introduction of a potential
realm —truly independent of actuality— imposes the need of also developing
a (non-classical) potential notion of truth. It is exactly this which will be
discussed in the following section.
5 Truth in the Potential Realm
An important point which needs to be clearly understood is the fact that
the introduction of an ontological realm independent of actuality implies
the need of also introducing a different notion of truth to the classical one
—related to the correspondence of a sentence to an ASA. Indeed, the state-
ments that we must consider in relation to quantum superpositions do not
fulfill the constraints imposed by the classical notion of truth related to the
metaphysical realm of actuality.
We define potential truth, which we call p-truth, in relation to the set
of powers that potentially preexist in a PSA. This means we have a set of
powers {Pi} that, given a PSA, are p-true (see for a definition [16]). Given
a specific choice of a basis, such powers Pi become actualizable. The choice
of the basis or context is now a gnoseological choice, one that has the pur-
pose of analyzing in different ways the particular PSA —this is completely
analogous to the analysis of an ASA though different experimental set ups.
Notice that within our scheme, we recover an objective account of quantum
contextuality. In the same way as in classical physics we must observe a
physical object in different ways in order to lear about its actual properties,
quantum contexts become particular exposures of a potentially preexistent
state of affairs. While in classical physics an ASA is composed by objects
with actually preexistent properties, in QM a PSA is composed by poten-
tial preexistent powers, each one them possessing a definite potentia. While
18
classical statements of the type ‘the system S is composed by the property p’
are either true or false, the quantum statements ‘the quantum situation QS
is composed by the power Pk with potentia pk’ has two levels of analysis: it
might be p-true or p-false in relation to a specific PSA, and it might be true
or false in relation to a particular actualization. While the measurement of
a property requires a yes-no experiment, the measurement of a power and its
respective potentia requires a statistical experiment (see for discussion [14]).
As analyzed in [15], the Born rule becomes —within this interpretation—
an objective (probabilistic) account of the (ontological) potentia of a power.
We might remark that the main misunderstanding produced in the anal-
ysis by Krause and Arenhart comes from applying the classical notion of
truth (which is directly related to actuality) in order to discuss the notion
of contradictory power. Given a PSA and a QSΨ,B in which we have the the
following quantum superposition: α | ↑x〉+ β | ↓x〉. Both powers | ↑x〉 and
| ↓x〉 are potentially preexistent, i.e. the statements ‘the power | ↑x〉 exists
in the potential realm’ and ‘the power | ↓x〉 exists in the potential realm’ are
both p-true but not true. The powers cannot be accounted for by a single
yes-no experiment. As a matter of fact, if we measure the superposition we
know that only one power will become actual. One of the powers will be
true while the other will be false.
Our definition of potential contradiction is related to the actualization
of the potential realm. In our example the p-true powers are contradictory
only with respect to the actual realm. Recalling the definition of the square
of opposition:
Contradictory Propositions: α and β are contradictory when both [po-
tential powers] cannot be [actually] true and both cannot be [actually] false.
From the above analysis, it is the uncritical use of the classical notion of
truth —which relates to an actualist metaphysical perspesctive— which is
responsible for many misunderstandings regarding quantum superpositions
and their meaning in terms of physical reality. Krause and Arenhart argue
with respect to Schro¨dinger’s cat that, “according to [the PAQS], [...] the
cat must be dead and alive. So, there cannot be alternate truth values in
this case, for both must be simply true.” The resolution to the paradox
comes from the distinction of both realms and from the proper definition of
the specific notion of truth used in each one of the realms considered. Both
powers in a QS are p-true, but only one of them will be true. This shows
clearly that there is no conflict with the PPA in the potential realm nor with
the SR in the actual realm.
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In the following section, continuing with the PAQS proposal [7], we pro-
vide a paraconsistent formalization of the notion of power that is physically
coherent with our previous interpretation of quantum superpositions.
6 Formalizing Contradictory Powers in the Poten-
tial Realm
In [7] we delineated a paraconsistent logical foundation ZF1 for non-relativistic
QM. Let us suppose that a theory T is based on a logic L and that in L
there is a symbol ¬ that corresponds to negation. T is called inconsistent if
there exists at least a formula A such that A and ¬A are both theorems of
T ; otherwise, T is called consistent. T is said to be trivial if all its formulas
are theorems; otherwise, T is said to be non trivial. L is paraconsistent if it
can be the underlying logic of theories that are both inconsistent and non
trivial. Clearly, if L has, say, two negations, a theory, based on L, may be
consistent with reference to one of the negations, but not in connection with
the other. (Here a monadic propositional symbol ¬ is called a weak negation
if it has a significant number of formal properties of classical negation, and a
pair of formulas A and ¬A, being theorems of a theory T , whose underlying
logic is L, do not necessarily cause the triviality of T .) If A and ¬A are
two formulas, where ¬ is a negation, they are called ¬-contradictory. When
there is only one negation ¬, we simply say that A and ¬A are contradictory
formulas. When L (and in consequence T ) possesses a conjunction, ∧, with
the usual properties, A and ¬A are theorems of T if, and only if, A ∧ ¬A is
also a theorem of T . Contradictions are formulas of form A ∧ ¬A. If L has
two or more negations, we have different kinds of contradictions.
The system ZF1 of [7] contains two types of negation. The weak (primi-
tive) negation ¬ and the strong (defined) negation ¬∗. Therefore, any theory
T , having ZF1 as its underlying logic, may be weakly inconsistent, but not
strongly inconsistent, etc. In particular, we have in ZF1:
(A ∧ ¬A) → B
where A and B are formulas, is not a theorem, but
(A ∧ ¬∗A) → B
is probable.
Taking into account the axioms and rules of ZF1, any strong contradic-
tion, provable in ZF1, causes its triviality. However, weak contradictions do
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not, in general, imply triviality. Another important point is that classical
elementary logic and usual set theory (ZF ) are both obtainable inside ZF1
if strong negation, ¬∗, is employed. So, it is easy to prove that any contra-
diction that doesn’t entail the triviality of ZF1 has to be a weak contradic-
tion. These results are consequences of the fact that ZF1 was conceived to
contain, in a certain sense classical logic, set theory and traditional math-
ematics, and, simultaneously, to allow for certain types of contradictions.
In effect, as already referred to in [7], ZF1 constitutes a paraconsistent set
theory in which theories may be constructed that are weakly inconsistent
though non-trivial. (ZF1 seems to be strongly consistent, and it is possible
to show that if this statement is true, then the usual ZF would also be
consistent.)
Apparently, ZF1 is not only weakly consistent but also strongly con-
sistent. Weakly inconsistencies can only be derived in a theory T , built on
ZF1, if they are originated by the specific postulates of T . So, our main task
is to show how some of such contradictions do occur in ZF1 with the pos-
tulates of T in case that T is QM. Therefore, we introduce in this discipline
new axioms which reflect the existence of some weak contradictions inherent
in QM. However, we must be careful, because ZF1 contains as subsystems,
elementary classical logic and set theory. Taking into account the preceding
considerations, we are going to show how weak contradictions naturally ap-
pear in QM1, that is, in non relativistic QM founded on ZF1.
We shall take into account, in what follows, a fixed PSA, Ψ, and a definite
QSΨ,B, given by the representation of Ψ in a specific basis B. In QM1 we
postulate the existence of powers. So we adopt the following:
Postulate 6.1 There exist a non-empty set of objects P called powers.
Definition 6.2 A quantum event is an ordered pair (A, ∆), where A is an
hermitian operator and ∆ is a Borel set of reals.
Definition 6.3 A quantum statement is an assertion according to which the
power Pk has the potentia pk when the PSA is given by the wave function
Ψ. When the power Pk is part of the PSA we say that it is a p-true quantum
statement. Given a ‘quantum event k’ we say that the correspondent power
Pk is true.
Postulate 6.4 To any p-true quantum statement there corresponds a power
with a definite potentia and conversely. The measure of the potentia is given
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via the Born rule and coincides with the quantum probability 〈Ψ|Pαi |Ψ〉 =
Tr[PΨPαi ].
Definition 6.5 Given the true quantum statement s, the corresponding power
is denoted by Ps. Each power has a corresponding potentia ps.
The preceding postulates allows us to extend to the set of powers P with
potentia p, the propositional syntactical structure of the sentences of C1,
which is the propositional logic underlying ZF1. In the reminder of this
article, we shall treat only the case in which the basis of the Hilbert space
has cardinal 2. But the extension to all cases is not difficult. QM implies that
in certain situations such as a typical Stern Gerlach experiment one needs to
consider contradictory powers. To obtain contradictions or inconsistencies
in QM1, one has to postulate, directly, their existence.
Postulate 6.6 If we have a QSΨ,B represented by c1| ↑〉+c2| ↓〉 (which can
be also noted c1P↑+ c2P↓) then the quantum statements ‘the power P↑ is in
the QSΨ,B and its potentia has the value p↑ = |c1|2’ and ‘the power P↓ is
in the QSΨ,B and its potentia has the value p↓ = |c2|2’ are both p-true. If
| ↑〉 is contradictory to | ↓〉 (e.g., as in a SG experiment) then P↑ ∧¬P↑ and
P↓ ∧ ¬P↓, where ¬ is the weak negation of ZF1.
In consequence, the superposition entails for powers PA with potentia, pA
(0 < pA < 1), the existence of weakly contradictory powers in the just
mentioned case, with the potencies |c1|2 and |c2|2. We could reinforce this
last postulate 6.6 assuming, in addition, that P↑ → ¬P↑ and P↓ → ¬P↓.
According to the spectral theorem, to every quantum event (A,∆) cor-
responds a projection operator PA∆ , satisfying the following condition: the
probability that a measurement of A in the PSA Ψ yields a value in A is
〈Ψ|PA∆ |Ψ〉. Therefore, we have:
Proposition 6.7 Since our underlying logic (and set theory) is ZF1, that
contains ZF when the strong negation is employed in the role of classical
negation, then the set of powers (and that of events) has the structure of the
set of all subspaces of a Hilbert space.
Therefore,
Proposition 6.8 In ZF1, the sets of quantum propositions and the set of
associate powers constitute an orthomodular lattice.
In a future paper we attempt to formally account for the incompatibility
of multiple quantum situations and powers.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we have provided a paraconsistent formalization of the power
interpretation of QM [10, 12, 15]. We should remark that this proposed inter-
pretation of the PAQS is one in between many possible interpretations that
could use the PAQS for their own theoretical and conceptual developments.
Both formal and conceptual developments open new doors to understand
physical theories. We should not stick dogmatically to presupposed notions
and formal schemes simply because they have worked fairly well in the past
(e.g., the notion of particle, actual property, etc.). As remarked by Einstein,
this can lead to the impossibility of true developments within science itself:
“Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily achieve
such an authority over us that we forget their earthly origins and ac-
cept them as unalterable givens. Thus they come to be stamped as
‘necessities of thought,’ ‘a priori givens,’ etc. The path of scientific
advance is often made impossible for a long time through such errors.”
[25, p. 102]
We should remain open to new developments that can allow us to discuss
QM from new original perspectives. The PAQS attempts to advance exactly
in this direction.
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